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This work studies the hedging policies of 42 pulp and paper companies in 2014. 
My focus is on the use of financial derivatives as a hedging strategy to mitigate 
the commodity risk exposure. Theories of hedging based on market 
imperfections show that hedging should increase firm´s value by reducing 
expected taxes, probability of financial distress and the agency costs of debt and 
equity.  
To provide evidence on these hypotheses, I collected detailed financial 
information of the firms included in the sample, to develop two econometric 
models capable of giving consistent insights, in order to infer which firm´s 
characteristics are associated to the theoretical hedging incentives and if 
consequently this hedging decision is connected to higher firm value within this 
industry.  
The data suggest that hedger firms have less coverage of fixed claims and have a 
higher percentage of managerial ownership comparing to the non-hedger firms. 
Furthermore, I found evidence that there is no advantage for larger firms within 
this industry to develop hedging strategies to mitigate their commodity risk 
exposure, not giving support to the argument of economies in scale in hedging. 
There is also no support for the hedging tax incentive, rejecting the theoretical 
background that firms hedge in response to tax schedule convexity. Using 
Tobin´s Q as an approximation for firm value, I found evidence that firms with 
more growth opportunities in their investment set and with lower levels of debt 
have higher Tobin´s Q ratios. However, I found evidence that hedging 
commodity risk within this industry with financial derivatives does not seem to 
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Companies across all the industrial sectors manage their exposure to commodity 
prices in many different ways. However, the recent strong unpredictability 
observed in commodity prices has triggered uncertainty in every market and 
business lines.  Many industrial companies started to view commodity risk as a 
key threat, due to the heightened volatility and complexity in world markets. The 
present work approaches the pulp and paper industry, once commodity risk 
tends to be central to the company’s value proposition within this industry. This 
dissertation core is on the relation between corporate risk management and 
strategies developed by the firms within this industry to mitigate their exposure 
to commodity prices, since there is evidence that volatility in commodity prices 
is typically greater than volatility in other financial risk factors, such as foreign 
currency or interest rate uncertainties.  
Strategies to manage commodity risk exposures can vary significantly, although 
my focus is only on the mitigation of this specific risk exposure through 
derivative hedging strategies. Derivative financial instruments are taken as the 
most flexible and cost-effective tools to manage price risk and to synthetically 
hedge underlying price exposures. Foreign currency and interest rate markets 
are characterized by having a broader and extensive offer and companies can 
efficiently manage their risks, once the derivatives can be tailored to meet the 
specifics needs of a corporate risk policy. However, in the commodity markets, 
given the highly specific needs of the risk profiles users, timing and delivery 





Taking into consideration all these particularities, finance theory suggests that 
the use of derivatives as a hedging strategy can increase firm value by reducing 
expected costs of financial distress, taxes and agency costs. The first purpose of 
this dissertation is to provide evidence regarding the relationship between the 
hedging decision and firm characteristics within this industry, and if in 
accordance to hedging theory, they have the necessary characteristics and 
conditions to profitably benefit from the establishment of a corporate risk 
management to mitigate the commodity risk exposure. Namely, and in 
accordance to the related hedging literature incentives: which firm´s 
characteristics can awaken the willingness to develop a specific hedging strategy 
to mitigate commodity risk exposure?  
After discerning about the characteristics, the second purpose of this work is to 
provide deeper understanding regarding the direct evidence between hedging 
commodity prices and firm value. After controlling for the effects of the different 
firm characteristics on firm value, I will provide evidence regarding the most 
debated question on the risk management literature: does hedging commodity 
risk add value for companies within the pulp and paper industry? 
The first section of the dissertation takes us through the various streams of 
corporate risk management. Theorists developed many explanations behind 
firm’s decisions to establish risk management policies. Moreover, they developed 
two main classes of theories, which intend to explain why managers undertake 
risk management policies. For both theories, the shareholder maximization and 
managerial utility hypotheses, I will provide the knowledge developed 
throughout the time by scholars, regarding their studies to test the accuracy 
behind the benefits associated to hedging. Taking their models as a starting point 
and focusing on the scope of my study, subsequently I will provide their 




dissertation: hedging and firm characteristics, hedging and firm value and the 
implication of managerial and institutional ownership for the hedging decision-
making. 
To give answers for the questions mentioned above, I constructed two different 
econometric models based on the financial data collected for 42 companies within 
the pulp and paper industry. For the first question, I established the denominated 
hedging and firm characteristics model based on the approaches of Nance, Smith 
and Smith (1993) and the revisited work to the previous study made by Fok, 
Carroll and Chiou (1997).  Regarding the second question, I developed a model 
based on the approach made by Jin and Jorin. (2006) and changed their study 
spectrum from the oil and gas producers to the pulp and paper industry.  
On the last section of my dissertation, I provide evidence on my tested models 
and conclusions in the light of the hedging theory. Moreover, I connect these to 
the specific growing challenges available for the pulp and paper companies. 
Furthermore, aware of the limitations of my study range, I will suggest some 





2. Literature Review 
 
When introduced to finance courses, individuals are presented to the two main 
pillars of modern finance. The concepts of efficient markets and diversification. 
Market efficiency simply means that markets don´t leave money on the table and 
opportunistic behaviors are not rewarded. Information is provided for free and 
is incorporated in prices, so that one can´t make profits from it. Therefore, a 
corporation with a given risk exposure, if the expected returns seems reasonably 
good, it is only because this exposure derives from risks rewarded by the market 
(Stulz (1996)). The concept of diversification refers to the ability of the 
shareholders to diversify the risks of a corporation, excluding common risks, 
such as business cycles. Hence, a corporation strategy to reduce diversifiable 
risks only makes sense if these risks impose possible losses and real costs for the 
corporation. 
According to Modigliani and Miller, if a firm chooses to change its hedging 
policy, investors who hold claims issued by the firm can change their holdings of 
risky assets to offset any change in the firm´s hedging policy, leaving the 
distribution of their future wealth unaffected (Smith and Stulz (1985)). 
Modigliani and Miller (1958) explained that with fixed investment policy and 
with no contracting costs or taxes, corporate financing policy is irrelevant.  
Haushalter (2000) also stated that in a perfect market world, we can only look to 
risk management as a financial transaction, not having any effect on the market 
value of the firm”.  
In a fluid and frictionless capital market with no asymmetric information, risk 
management at the firm level is predicted to be a negative NPV project as in a 




management would be irrelevant, since shareholder can hedge on their own at 
the same costs (Campello et al. 2011).  
However, in the real world, where investor´s information is far from complete 
and financial troubles can disrupt a company’s operation, a bad outcome 
resulting from a diversifiable risk, (e.g., an unexpected spike in a currency or 
commodity price) can have costs that go well beyond the immediate hit to cash 
flow and earnings (Nocco and Stulz (2006). In practice, imperfect markets create 
many reasons for a firm to minimize its risk exposure. As Gay and Nam (1998) 
suggested on their work about the underinvestment problem and derivatives 
usage by firms, financial economics offers several hypotheses to explain why 
corporate hedging can be rational or value enhancing, each of them relies on 
some form of market imperfection. 
The concept of risk management can be defined as the “process of identification, 
analysis and either acceptance or mitigation of uncertainty in investment 
decision-making “. Risk management have been developed to help companies to 
identify relevant risks and to ensure that a company have enough cash available 
to make investments that have a positive net present value (NPV) (Froot et al. 
1994).   
The first definitions on the finance literature about the thematic of hedging, back 
to the beginning of the nineteen century. Hardy & Lyon (1923) defined hedging 
as a “coincident purchase and sale in two markets which are expected to behave 
in such way that any loss realized in one market will be offset by an equivalent 
gain in the other”. With their vision, the authors contemplated hedging as a 
common tool in risk management that can be used as an insurance to reduce risk, 




First developed by Hardy & Lyon (1923), the main goal of the hedging theory 
was to give some clarification about hedging and how it can be used. On the first 
approach, Hardly & Lyon (1923) stated that hedging has become a popular tool 
for risk management to reduce and transfer risk. They claimed that the point of 
hedging is to make a company capable of compensate loses in one market with 
gains in another market. For instance, entering into a derivative contract can help 
a company to be protected against unfavorable price changes or any other 
financial risks, enabling them to have the right to buy or sell for a specific price 
at a specific time or lock in a specific price in a specific moment of time. Forward 
contracts are designed to neutralize risk by fixing the price that the hedger will 
pay or receive for the underlying asset. Option contracts, by contrast, provide 
insurance. They offer a way for companies to protect themselves against adverse 
price movements in the future. (John C. Hull, 2008).  On a more simplistic view, 
corporate hedging refers to the use of a wide range of derivatives instruments– 
forwards, futures, swaps and options – to reduce the volatility of firm value. 
Campello et al. (2011) stated that nearly all large corporations around the world 
have a risk management program that includes hedging in some way to protect 
themselves against financial risks. Companies are exposed to several financial 
risks and all of these risks such as market risks, liquidity risks and credit risks 
need to be taken into account if a firm want to create a long-term value for its 
shareholders. Among the many different strategies to mitigate their exposure, a 
corporation can manage risks in one of two fundamentally different ways: (1) one 
risk at a time, on a largely decentralized basis; or (2) all risks viewed together 




denominated “enterprise risk management”, or “ERM1” for short (Nocco and 
Stulz (2006)). 
However, hedging is very versatile and companies can have very sophisticated 
or simple hedging strategies. According to Hardly and Lyon (1923), the “perfect 
hedge is the one that offset all changes in price, locking the price from both 
downward and upward movements”.  
Nevertheless, Haushalter (2000) argues that despite the prevalence of corporate 
risk management and the effort that has been devoting to developing theoretical 
rationales for hedging, there are no widely accepted explanations for risk 
management as a corporate policy. Regardless the extensive research on this 
field, there are uncertainties of whether company should hedge and how it affects 
the market value of a firm. 
The first research was elaborated by Ralph H. Stiles, who developed the oldest 
and recognized study on the thematic, on his research regarding how millers can 
protect themselves from adverse price fluctuations. In his paper, Stiles (1922) 
acknowledged that small price variations could have a negative impact on the 
producers’ profits, leading them to a situation of financial distress. 
Later, Johnson (1960) presented a revised concept of hedging that had the same 
objective as modern portfolio theory (MPT2): to minimize the variance and to 
define risk as the standard deviation of a two-asset hedge portfolio. He 
developed a model which incorporated speculation in the futures market, in 
                                                 
1 Enterprise risk management (ERM) is synonymous with integrated risk management (IRM) 
and enterprise-wide risk management. 
2 Modern portfolio theory (MPT) is a theory on how risk-averse investors can build their own 
portfolios in order to maximize expected return based on a given level of market risk. Establishing 




order to calculate the optimal amount of forwards and futures that companies 
should buy or sell. On the other hand, unlike Johnson´s (1960) approach, Stulz 
(1984) developed a model for value-maximizing firms that use an active hedging 
policy, by assigning the manager with the key role in the hedging decision and 
not the shareholders. Stulz (1984) model was a continuous-time model that can 
be revised when the company receives new information, which gives us a more 
dynamic model that can be improved over time. 
More recently, Brown & Toft (2002) on his work related to the problematic of how 
firms should hedge, concluded that the optimal hedging for a value maximizing 
firm company is much more complex than previous literature has suggested. 
They asserted that “simply selling expected output forward is rarely, if ever, the 
optimal risk management strategy”. A perfect hedge is very rare in practice and 
therefore the aim of hedging strategies is to create a position that perform as 
closely to perfect as possible (Hull, 2008).  
Developing an optimal hedging strategy will always be a continuously and an 
unfinished work. However, risk management through financial hedging has 
become increasingly important in recent years, with the International Swaps and 
Derivatives Association (ISDA)3 reporting that virtually all of the world´s largest 
companies use derivatives to hedge their business and financial risks.  
The recently intensification and increase in corporate risk management policies, 
introduced by companies to mitigate their risk exposures is a challenge for the 
Modigliani and Miller paradigm. Modigliani and Miller approach underlies that 
“buying and selling financial derivatives contracts cannot alter the company’s 
                                                 
3 ISDA, the International Swaps and Derivatives Association was established in 1985 and has 
been a leader in promoting sound risk management processes and practices around the world in 





value, since individual investors in the company’s stock can always buy and sell 
such contracts themselves if they care to adjust their exposure to a certain risk”. 
Moreover, as Froot, Scharfstein and Stein (1993) documented on their work about 
risk management and how to coordinate corporate investment and financing 
policies that “corporations are increasingly take risk management very seriously 
and this management policy is ranked by the financial executives as one of their 
most important objectives”. 
Most of theoretical research in corporate risk management argues that firms can 
increase value by hedging. Theorists developed many explanations behind firm’s 
decisions to establish risk management policies, reflecting how and why they use 
the most diversified hedging strategies to deal with the uncertainties 
underpinned by their risk exposures. On their notorious efforts to study and 
explain more deeply the decision-making regarding risk management, they 
have developed two major classes of explanations related to the managers’ 
choices of risk management strategies on behalf of their firms.  
The first explanation relies on risk management as a tool to maximize 
shareholder value and the other one focuses on risk management as means to 
maximize mangers’ private utility.  
On the next section, I will start to describe the theoretical explanations for risk 
management, the shareholder maximization hypotheses and the managerial 
utility maximization hypotheses. Later on, I will provide empirical evidence of 
hedging in raw materials industries, giving some insights about characteristics 
and the impact in firm value for companies that have an active risk management 




2.1. Shareholder Maximization Hypotheses 
 
The first class of theory that explains why managers undertake risk 
management activities is based on shareholder value maximization. The 
argument of shareholder maximization claims that firm’s hedge to diminish the 
multiple costs related to the higher volatility of cash flows. 
 
2.1.1 Reducing the probability of bankruptcy 
 
Mayers & Smith (1982) and Smith & Stulz (1985) stated that hedging reduces 
the probability that a firm encounters financial distress by reducing the variance 
of firm value, and thereby reduces the expected costs of financial distress. The 
likelihood for a firm to incur in a situation of financial distress is directly related 
to the size of the firm’s fixes claims relative to the value of its assets, meaning that 
hedging becomes more valuable as the firm´s fixed claims rise. 
 
Stulz (1996) also argued that bankruptcy costs provide the simplest example of a 
real resource cost that can be saved through risk management: “A firm where the 
cash flows fluctuate randomly over time, if the firm has debt, it could happen 
that with a bad cash flow draw, the firm has to file for bankruptcy”. When 
bankruptcy has real resource costs, the present value of these real costs reduces 
firm value. If the firm can establish a corporate hedging policy that eliminates the 
risk of bankruptcy, it essentially sets the present value of these real resource costs 
to zero and increases firm value accordingly (Stulz, 1996). Hence, Stulz (1996, 
2003) sustained that any potential value creation role for risk management is in 
the reduction of “costly lower-tail outcomes”. These lower tail realizations are 




indirect costs. Direct costs are incurred when the firm have to incur in expenses 
related to lawyers and courts, whereas indirect costs are associated with the loss 
of reputation that may affect costumer and vendor relationships. 
 
Costs of financial distress can have a real negative impact on the present and 
future earnings of a firm. The failure to develop valuable investments is 
translated into a real resource cost for the firm. However, if hedging can be used 
to lower the expected bankruptcy costs, it will increase firm value, by opening 
up opportunities to potential bondholders to invest. Campello et al. (2011) 
highlighted that firms that hedge pay lower interest rate spreads will likely have 
less tight restrictions on their debt agreements. Bessembinder (1991), on his study 
about the relation between the use of forward contracts and firm value, also 
contend that risk management reduces the expected costs of bankruptcy. 
 
All of these arguments serve to reach to same conclusion as Stulz (1996), when 
he argued that risk management could be value creating if it is able to reduce the 
likelihood of the mentioned negative earning shocks and in turn, help the firm to 




In a distinguished seminal article, Smith and Stulz (1985) stated that firms facing 
an income tax liability function that is convex in taxable income could reduce 




Taking into consideration Jensen´s inequality 4definition, if a firm´s effective tax 
schedule is convex, expected taxes are diminished by hedging (Mayers and Smith 
(1982) and Smith and Stulz (1985)). The statutory progressivity factor generate a 
convex tax schedule and the more convex the effective tax schedule, the greater 
the attenuation in expected taxes. Therefore, firms with more of the range of their 
pretax income in the progressive region of the tax schedule have greater tax-
based incentives to hedge.  
In addition to progressive marginal tax rates, the convexity of the tax function 
arises from the existence of tax shields such as tax loss carrybacks and 
carryforwards, implying that the tax benefit of hedging is greater if the firm has 
more tax preference items. These tax shields are used to extend or stretch the 
convex portion of tax function of the firms.  
Green and Talmor (1985), performed a completely different and interesting 
approach regarding the objective to demonstrate what is firm´s behavior in the 
presence of asymmetric tax treatment of positive and negative incomes. They 
stated that the tax liability of a firm could be thought as a government written 
call option on future income streams, with the strike price equal to the value of 
allowable deductions on taxable earnings. On their research, their findings 
enabled them to conclude that “as the volatility of pre-tax earnings declines, the 
value of the call option - the amount of the tax liabilities – drops”. This gives firms 
an incentive to hedge. 
Another contribution for the hedging literature was made by Gézcy, Minton and 
Schrand (1997). At the time, this work differed from the others, because it was 
                                                 
4 Jensen´s inequality was introduced by Johan Jensen, a Danish mathematician who proved 





one of the first cross-sectional studies to examine the determinants of corporate 
derivatives using merely firms that had ex ante exposure to foreign exchange risk 
and also by employing new annual report disclosures required by the Financial 
Accounting Standard Board, rather than survey. Based on the variance reducing 
tax-hedging argument of Smith and Stulz (1985), the authors evaluated the 
availability of tax preference items, taking into account the book value of net 
operating loss carryforwards scaled by total assets (NOL) of the firms included 
in their study sample. The results achieved by Géczy, Minton and Schrand (1997) 
on their investigation, enabled them to disagree from the Smith and Stulz (1985) 
tax explanations behind the decision to develop a corporate risk management 
program. 
Graham and Smith (1999) also streamlined the literature on risk management, by 
using stimulated methods, rather than employ survey or regression analysis. 
They stimulated a given reduction in the volatility of taxable income to examine 
the extent to which hedging strategies can change a firm’s expected liability. 
From their analysis, they found that in approximately 50% of the cases, 
corporations face convex effective tax functions and thus have tax-based 
incentives to hedge. 
Graham and Rogers (2002) also focused their work on tax incentives for 
corporations to hedge: to increase debt capacity and interest tax deductions and 
to reduce tax liability if the tax function is convex. Whereas by that that time, 
most hedging papers only investigated large companies, Graham and Rogers 
(2002), constructed their study sample on a broad cross sections of firms and their 
holdings of corporate derivatives. They investigated whether firms resort to the 
use of derivatives to implement risk management strategies in response to tax 
incentives. Earlier studies only investigated derivatives holdings to identify 




establishment of a risk management. Nevertheless, Graham and Rogers (2002) 
paper added to the hedging literature by testing whether corporations respond 
to two tax-related incentives to hedge. Namely, the incentive to reduce volatility, 
thereby increasing debt capacity and the tax benefits of debt. Second, the 
incentive to reduce tax liabilities by reducing the volatility of taxable income. On 
their work, Graham and Rodgers (2002) started from Smith and Stulz 
hypothesize, on which firm’s hedge in response to tax function convexity, and so 
by the Jensen´s inequality, companies can reduce expected tax liabilities by 
hedging to reduce income volatility. Moreover, they argued that virtually every 
empirical study that investigates the use of derivatives includes a wrong variable 
to proxy for tax function convexity. Instead, their option was to use tax function 
convexity as a proxy to infer about the relation between derivative holding and 
convexity. The authors considered this work as the first direct examination of 
hedging and tax function convexity.   
As Graham and Rogers (2002) argued that most empirical derivatives papers 
measure tax convexity with the wrong proxy variables. Furthermore, Graham 
and Rodgers argued that variables based on existing net operating loss carry 
forwards (NOL’s) are too simple to capture incentives that result from the shape 
of the tax function, and might work backwards for expected loss firms.  
Subsquently, in a joint effort, Graham and Smith (1999) and Graham and Rogers 
(2002) investigated the tax incentive to hedge and concluded that U.S. firm hedge 
to increase their debt capacity, but both papers rejected the idea that firms hedge 
in response to tax schedule convexity. 
Haushalter (2000) on his study about hedging policies of oil and gas producers 
referred that firms with low leverage tax rates are assumed to be more likely to 




A more recent study elaborated by Bartram et al. (2009), investigated the motives 
for companies to use financial derivatives, with a broadly coverage sample.  They 
agglomerated firm´s from more than 50 countries that stood for 80% of the global 
market capitalization. The authors stated that tax incentives to hedge exist for 
firms that face a convex tax schedule, either because increasing marginal tax rates 
(statutory progressivity) or tax preference items 5(investment tax credits, foreign 
tax credits, tax loss carry forward, etc.).  Moreover, Bartram et al. (2009) claimed 
that there is a stronger interest to hedge if firms have many tax preference items, 
because unused tax preference items can lose value in present value terms. 
However, they proved that previous hedging theories regarding the tax 
determinant to hedge are not conclusive to explain why companies use 
derivatives instruments for hedging. 
Departing from the literature, one can expect that a firm would like more income 
when its tax rate is low and less income when its tax rate is high. Since tax rates 
increase with taxable income, a risk management program that reduces the risk 
of taxable income ends up decreasing expected taxes as well. 
2.1.3. Under-investment problem and cost of raising funds 
 
Myers (1977) characterizes firms’ potential investment opportunities as options 
and demonstrates that, with fixed claims in the firm’s capital structure, taking a 
positive net present value project can reduce shareholder’s wealth if the gain 
accrues primarily to debtholders. Consequently, shareholders can have 
incentives to forego positive NPV projects and Myers call this as the 
underinvestment problem. By restricting the states in which the firm would 
                                                 
5 Tax preference items are in summary, tax-exempt items that investors can deduct them from 




default on bond payments, hedging can control this problem. Hence, firms with 
more growth opportunities in their investment opportunity set are more likely to 
undertake a hedging program aimed to reduce the variance of the firm value. 
Since the underinvestment problem is more pronounced with more debt in the 
firm’s capital structure, firms with higher leverage are more likely to hedge.  
Bessembinder (1991) states that in theory, hedging commits firms to meeting 
obligations in states of the world in which they would fail and makes it more 
difficult for managers to engage in risk-shifting. Bessembinder (1991) also 
demonstrated that by reducing the probability of default, hedging could reduce 
the incentive for equity holders to underinvest, which improves contracting 
terms with debtholders. 
As described in Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein (1993) work about coordinating 
investment and financing policies, costly external financing is a market 
imperfection that makes hedging a value-enhancing strategy. That is, an 
underinvestment problem results when firms find that external financing is 
sufficiently expensive that they must reduce investment spending during times 
when internally generated cash flows are not sufficient to finance growth 
opportunities. Hedging or risk management in this situation adds value because 
it helps ensure that the corporation has sufficient funds available to take 
advantage of attractive investment opportunities.  
Pagach & Warr (2010) referred that indirect costs hamper the possibility to 
pursue profitable growth options, and the ability to realize the full value of 
intangible assets upon liquidation. For instance, as a firm becomes weaker 
financially, it becomes more difficult for the firm to raise funds, so that it may 




Gay and Nam (1998) extended the previous findings on determinants of 
corporate hedging strategies with derivatives, by examining more closely the 
underinvestment hypothesis modeled by Froot, Schrafstein and Stein (1993). 
Specifically, they studied the interaction effects among a firm’s investment 
opportunities, cash stock and internally generated funds in order to make a 
clearer distinction between the roles of the underinvestment hypothesis on the 
determinants of corporate hedging policy. The authors analyzed 486 publicly 
traded U.S non-financial firms in 1995 and find evidence of a positive relation 
between a firm’s derivatives use and its growth opportunities. Their main 
findings include insights about the interaction effects between a firm’s cash stock 
and its investments opportunities. The authors claimed that firms with enhanced 
investment opportunities sets use derivatives more when they also have lower 
levels of cash flow. Moreover, they suggested that the correlation between 
internally generated cash flow sand investment expenses also have impact on a 
firm’s derivative usage. The related findings disclosed by the two authors 
support the hypotheses that the use of derivatives by firms is driven in part by 
the need to avoid a possible problem of abandon growth investment 
opportunities that otherwise could had be an important driver of value creation. 
All of this evidence is consistent with the theory that risk management can reduce 
under-investment of Froot, Schraftstein and Stein (1993). 
Niam (1998) on his working paper related to the determinants of corporate 
hedging policies, claimed that once the under-investment problem is more 
pronounced for firms with more discretion in their investments decisions, 
hedgers are predicted to be firms that capture a relatively higher proportion of 
their market value from growth options relative to assets in place. Using the ratio 
of the market to book value of total assets as a proxy for the relative importance 




with more growth options would have market values higher than their book 
values. Hence, the authors predicted that hedgers would have higher market-to-
book ratio as compared to non-hedgers. 
On their study about the real and financial implications of corporate hedging, 
Campello, Lin and Zou (2011) identified precise mechanisms through which 
hedging affects real and finance corporate outcomes. By using an extensive, 
hand-collected dataset on corporate hedging activities, they accessed the impact 
of hedging on firm’s external financing costs and investment 
spending.  Accordingly, to the existent literature, Campello, Lin and Zou (2011) 
were the first to investigate simultaneously the impact of hedging on the cost of 
debt and their connection to capital expenditures and investment. The paper 
contribution to the hedging literature is to show that corporate hedging has a 
first-order effect on firm financing and investment. Their evidence suggest that 




If a company found itself in a situation of financial distress, stakeholders 
(workers, creditor or someone else that have a stake in the company) will be more 
negatively affected than the shareholders because they are not able to diversify 
risk. Thus, if a company suffer from a dramatic situation marked by the need to 
abandon profitability growth projects and consequently lose some investment 
opportunities, workers immediately after that negative period, will consider 
their jobs in the firm less attractive. They will also demand a higher salary, which 
ultimately affect the global costs of the company. In fact, workers are not able to 




of economies of scale, but the firm will be able to so for them. As Stulz (1996) 
stated on his paper about risk management, if a company successfully 
undertakes a risk management program that reduces the risk of financial distress, 
it will have lower wage costs. 
2.2. Managerial Utility Maximization Hypotheses 
 
The second class of theories focuses on risk management as a means to maximize 
manager’s private utility. This hypothesis relates to hedging as an incentive that 
managers have to maximize their personal utility function. 
2.2.1 Managerial compensation and hedging 
 
Shareholders choose the management compensation package, affecting the 
hedging policies that managers undertake. If shareholders make managerial 
wealth a concave function of firm value, managers will have more incentives to 
develop hedging programs. Managers, whose compensation is a concave or not 
too convex function of firm value, have incentives to reduce cash flow variability. 
That could lead to a situation where such managers might reject variance-
increasing positive NPV6 projects. As Smith and Stulz (1985) argued that risk-
averse managers have incentives to invest in less risky projects, even those 
projects that can create value for the company. In a situation of a completely 
concave function, the manager optimal solution is to hedge the firm entirely. 
                                                 
6 Net present value (NPV) is used to analyze the profitability of a projected investment and is 
the difference between the present value of cash inflows and the present value of cash outflows 




On the other hand, if risk management goes toward the risk reduction of those 
risky but promising projects, managers can accept the investments, benefiting 
shareholder’s wealth. 
However, if the manager´s compensation plan is a convex function of the firm’s 
value, it can be the case that the manager wealth improves if the firm option is 
not to hedge.  
Smith and Stulz (1985) also predicted that managers who hold more stocks would 
prefer more risk management strategies. The reason is that stocks provide a linear 
payoff as a function of the firm´s stock prices. Nonetheless, managers who hold 
more options on firm’s stock would prefer less risky management, because the 
value of the option and consequently the manager compensation will improve 
with higher uncertainty related with the stock prices of the company. 
2.2.2. Signaling managerial skill 
 
Demarzo and Duffie (1995) approach differed in a significant way from the 
analysis of the earlier literature on hedging. Rather than focus on the role of 
hedging in directly reallocating risk among parties, Demarzo and Duffie stressed 
the “information effect of hedging”. They extended the model of Holmstrom and 
Ricart i Costa (1986) and considered an environment in which uncertainty 
regarding managerial ability and project profitability implies that shareholders 
learn about the quality of the firm’s management and investments projects from 
observations of the firm’s performance. Moreover, by hedging price fluctuations, 
managers can alter the risk of the firm’s current profits, which in turn affects the 




Demazo and Duffie documented that if hedging positions are disclosed by a 
corporation, hedging eliminates a source of noise from the firm’s profits. By 
doing that, it makes profits a more informative signal of managerial quality.  The 
authors also stated that hedging might serve as a signal that helps labor market 
better evaluate and monitor performance of the firm’s managers under 
asymmetric information world.  
2.3. Evidence of hedging and firm value 
 
Froot, Scharfstein and Stein (1993) tested the possibility of hedging increase firm 
value to the extent that it helps to ensure that a company has sufficient internal 
funds available to take advantage of attractive investment opportunities, 
assuming that capital market imperfections make external sources of funds 
costly. Collecting data based on the firms hedging strategies in a broad range of 
industry sectors, they concluded that an optimal hedging strategy capable of 
creating value for a given firm will depend on either the nature of product market 
competition and on the hedging strategies adopted by its competitors. 
On a more industry-specific analysis, Tufano (1996) investigated 48 gold mining 
companies that used hedging as a risk management tool in the beginning of the 
ninety decade. Those studied firms shared a common and clear risk exposure, 
because their output is a globally traded, volatile commodity. Moreover, Tufano 
(1996) updated the model done by Froot, Scharfsyein and Stein (1993) by adding 
manager-shareholder agency costs to his model. By doing that, his work 
contradicted all the theoretical value incentives behind a risk management 
program. As the author mentioned, over 85% of the firms in this industry used a 
rich set of financial instruments to manage their gold price risk in 1990-1993. 




power of theories that view risk management as a means to maximize 
shareholder value. For Tufano (1996), risk management strategies are only 
capable of destroying value for the companies. Stulz (1996) also stated that the 
risk minimization with financial derivatives do not increase the value of a firm 
with a lower leverage regarding their capital structure. 
Haushalter (2000) on his study about risk management activities of oil and gas 
producers addressed some questions regarding the interaction of firm value and 
corporate hedging activities. Documenting a wide range of hedging policies 
among oil and gas producers, the author argued that differences in the costs of 
raising funds can have impact on the value of hedging. In other words, the more 
difficulties a company have in obtaining outside financing, the costlier a shortfall 
in cash will be and the greater is the value that hedging provides.  
One year after the study of Haushalter, Allaynanis and Weston (2001) published 
their work about the use of foreign currency derivatives in large non-financial 
firms in the U.S. and find support for the theory of shareholder maximization. 
They found evidence consistent with the hypothesis that the company’s use of 
foreign currency derivatives as a hedging tool, increases firm value. Using a 
recognized finance metric, the Tobin’s Q ratio as a proxy for firm value, they 
discovered that foreign exchange rate hedging is associated with a 4.8% premium 
comparing with firms which do not hedge that specific risk. They also mentioned 
that the hedging premium associated with an increase in firm value among firms 
with foreign currency exposure, is higher during periods in which the US dollar 
appreciates.  
Later on, Carter, Rogers and Simkins (2006) investigated jet fuel behavior of firms 
in the U.S. airline industry during 1992-2003, to examine whether such hedging 




to deliver a better understanding of the source of potential value from hedging 
by airlines. The authors also extolled the contribution of their study, because for 
them the homogeneity and competitiveness of the airline industry offers a unique 
perspective to analyze the value of firm’s hedging activities. Being the first to find 
empirical evidence pointing to the source of value from hedging operations, they 
documented that jet fuel hedging is positively related to airline firm value and 
the coefficients regarding the hedging variables on their regression analysis 
suggested a higher hedging premium, comparing to the research done by 
Allaynanis and Weston (2001). Carter, Rogers and Simikins (2006) referred that 
airlines employing a jet fuel hedging policy, trade at a premium. Moreover, they 
argued that hedging provides an additional source of cash for making 
acquisitions during periods of high jet fuel prices which in turn are directly 
connected to a time of more distressed airline companies. Their arguments serve 
to prove that they provide evidence that hedging can add value for the sector 
companies because reduction of jet fuel price risk exposure is undoubtedly 
economically significant.  
With their focus on the oil and gas sector, Jin and Jorion (2006) collected detailed 
information regarding hedging strategies and on the valuation of oil and gas 
reserves. They criticized the research done by Allaynanis and Weston (2001), 
arguing that the sample of their study was limitative because it covered a large 
number of firms in different industries and with different growth rates. Jin and 
Jorion (2006) constructed, by that time, the largest same-industry sample used to 
assess the hedging premium and included the hedging activities of more than 
100 U.S. oil and gas producers from 1998 to 2001 to examine the connection 
between hedging and firm value. Their findings suggested that in fact, exists an 
important difference between the nature of the commodity risk exposure of oil 




the authors, hedging commodity risk is easier to identify and to hedge by 
individual investors, since investors can go to the market and can hedge on their 
own, implying that hedging does not give a special advantage for the sample 
firms. Regarding the question of whether financial derivatives can add value or 
not, the authors did not give a simple answer, stating that, at a minimum, the 
hedging premium depends on the types of risks to which the firms are exposed. 
2.4. Evidence of hedging and firm characteristics 
 
On the thematic of hedging, many studies were conducted by several scholars 
regarding the decision-making of a firm to develop hedging strategies to mitigate 
their risk exposure. Namely there are several different research papers related to 
the possibility of the firms having the necessary characteristics to profitable 
benefit from using hedging as a tool to manage their risks. On their studies the 
authors separate companies by their decision to hedge or not and provide 
evidence related to which value-enhancing firm characteristics can distinguish 
the two groups.   
The study developed by Gézcy, Minton and Schrand (1997) is an example of the 
mentioned topic. The authors developed their study based on a sample mainly 
constituted by the use of financial derivatives for hedging purposes by U.S. large 
corporations in 1990 and after modeling the determinants of corporate use of 
currency derivatives, they demonstrated differences between currency 
derivatives users and non-users. Gézcy, Minton and Schrand (1997) concluded 
that firms which have their portfolio associated with strong growth opportunities 
but with more difficulty to raise internal and external funds are most likely to use 
currency derivatives. The authors also enumerated other distinguish firm 




institutional ownership and also stronger managerial option holdings. Although, 
the authors documented that both, users and non-users are similar in their 
managerial share ownership  
Leeland (1998) also examined risk management on his work about agency costs, 
risk management and capital structure. Leeland (1998) argued that hedging 
allows for a big portion of debt on the firm’s capital structure, a conclusion that 
goes toward the theoretical and literature research about hedging. However, the 
author surprisingly documented that the benefits of hedging are greater for a 
firm with lower agency costs. 
Graham and Smith (1999) focused their work on the tax incentives of hedging 
and differentiate firm’s characteristics, taking into consideration, their tax 
functions. The authors stated that for firms facing convex tax functions, the 
average tax savings from a 5% reduction in the volatility of taxable income are 
about 5.4% of expected tax liabilities and in extreme cases, these savings exceed 
40%. 
Bartram, Brown and Fehle (2003) also presented international evidence on the 
use of financial derivatives by non-financial firms across different countries and 
argued that the size of the local derivatives market can be an important factor to 
determine the derivatives usage by firms. In less developed countries with less 
liquid derivatives market, the usage of financial derivatives as a hedging tool is 
lower. Moreover, they followed the same structure as Nance (1993) and 
examined the theoretical negative association between the availability of hedging 
substitutes and the usage of financial derivatives to conduct the necessary 
hedging strategies. Bartram, Brown and Fehle (2003) argued that firms with 




as higher dividend payouts will probably have more financial derivatives in their 
portfolio to mitigate their risks. 
Nance et all (1993) on their study on the determinants of corporate hedging 
suggested that firms that use hedging instruments to mitigate their risk exposure, 
have consistently more growth options in their investment set and more convex 
tax schedules. Moreover, they stressed firms owned by well diversified investors, 
by saying that if we take into account the risk aversion factor, it will provide 
incentives for the firm to hedge more to manage its risk exposure. On the 
mentioned study, hedging is only positive in order to reduce volatility, 
increasing both the capacity for investment expenses and to raise funds from 
external investors. 
On a revisit to the determinants of corporate hedging study, Fok, Carroll and 
Chiou documented new insights about the hedger firm´s characteristics. They 
stated that large firms have a higher tendency to hedge, giving support to the 
economies of scale as a hedging argument. 
Dolde (1995) focused his approach on the relationship between and hedging and 
leverage on a way that he explained the anticipated relation between them. By 
doing that and controlling for primitive risk, Dolde (1995) discovered some 
evidence that hedging attenuate the effects of leverage. 
Carter, Rogers and Simkins (2006), following the same framework as Nance, 
Smith, Smithson (1993), showed that airline companies with more growth 
opportunities in their investment set have a higher tendency to hedge. They 
added also that if all airlines face similar bankruptcy costs, firms with lower 




Concerning the theoretical relation between firm characteristics and hedging, 
Tufano (1996) concluded that there is almost no significant association between 
risk management and firm characteristics. Nevertheless, he stated that firms in 
the gold mining industry with lower cash balances are more receptive to perform 
risk management strategies in order to mitigate their gold price exposure. 
2.5. Evidence on managerial and institutional ownership 
 
Stulz (1984) and Smith and Stulz (1985) documented some findings on 
managerial risk aversion as a driver of corporate risk management. Their models 
revealed that managers with higher stock ownership would prefer more to 
engage in risk management activities, while managers with higher options 
holdings would prefer less risk management. They justified their findings based 
on the assumptions that the global convexity of the option contract will make 
managers more available to take riskier investments, whereas stocks only 
provides linear payoffs which increases their willing to reduce the risk 
exposure. Guy and Nam (1998) extended their findings on the risk manager 
aversion topic. They explained that risk manager aversion can have an impact on 
the firm’s hedging decision, once managers with non-diversified personal wealth 
due to higher firm stock ownership, might have a stronger preponderance to 
develop hedging strategies policies. 
On a more industry specific analysis, Tufano (1996) and Haushaler (2010) also 
documented their conclusions regarding the connection between ownership and 
hedging.  Tufano (1996) after analyzing corporate risk management policies in 
the gold mining industry suggested evidence that managers who hold a large 
number of firm shares in their portfolio have a higher willingness to adopt 




hold more options on their firm shares, they will have an incentive to increase 
the earnings volatility of the firm, decreasing the amount of funds invested in 
risk management strategies. 
Haushalter (2010) investigated whether the oil and gas producers hedges against 
price fluctuations is related to ownership structure. The author, did not find any 
evidence regarding a positive correlation between hedging and the degree of 
managerial stock ownership. Specifically, Haushalter (2010) demonstrated that 
the fraction of the commodity production hedged is negatively related to the 
fraction of shares held by investors. Nevertheless, he reached to the same 
conclusion as Jin and Jorion (2006), arguing that the fraction of production 
hedged is negatively correlated with the number of call options held on shares 
companies by the managers. 
Fok, Carroll and Chiou (1996) also examined the relationship between ownership 
structure and firm value and added that corporate ownership structure may 
affect the willingness for a firm to develop hedging strategies. For them, hedging 
can be in the manager’s best interest if a greater percentage of their personal 
portfolios are directly connected to the results of the firm, in the form of wage 
income. Fok, Carroll and Chiou (1996) concluded that a larger percentage of 
managerial ownership is directly related with a stronger incentive to hedge.  
Furthermore, Fok, Carrol and Chiou (1996) considered insider ownership as 
proxy for agency costs of equity. They used the same arguments as Crutchney 
and Hensen (1989) and Bhagat and Jefferis (1988), when these latest appointed to 
the fact that due to the capacity of institutional investors to restrain an 
opportunistic behavior developed by managers, this implied disciplinary 




including hedging. Thus, the likelihood for a firm to conduct hedging strategies 




















3. Data   
 
Almost all firms in commodity industries are exposed to certain market risks as 
parts of their ongoing business operations, including risks from changes in their 
principal product selling prices, costs of commodity like raw materials and 
energy, interest rates and foreign exchange rates. With today´s markets 
continuing to experience unprecedented volatility, companies are looking at 
commodity price risk management as an integral part of their strategy for 
managing costs and to develop a competitive advantage. My goal is to determine 
if corporate hedging activities with financial derivatives designed to mitigate the 
commodity price risk, which reduce income volatility, also have the expected 
impact on firm value, as the theoretical research has suggested many ways in 
which corporate hedging might increase firm value (Smith and Stulz (1985); 
Bessembinder (1991)).  
3.1. Study sample  
 
The sample of companies used in this study is constituted by listed firms in the 
forest and paper industry in North America, South America, Europe and 
Australia. We collect data on their risk management strategies with financial 
derivatives, regarding commodity price exposure over the year of 2014.  
For all firms in the sample, I extracted information from Data Stream, a leading 
global provider of integrated based solutions to business and professional 
costumers, namely financial data such as net income, market value of common 




Next, I read all the financial reports, which I downloaded directly from firm’s 
websites, to see whether firms hedge against commodity prices, over the sample 
period.  
In the sample of the study, I found firms of the forestry and paper industry that 
use many types of derivatives instruments. The ways in which hedging 
theoretically increases firm value are not limited to a particular type of hedging 
but are only related to the final objective of reducing income volatility. Therefore, 
I made an assumption regarding how the firms develop their hedging strategies 
with financial instruments: there is no need to restrict and differentiate the 
hedging activities to a subset of derivative instruments. 
The list companies and their use of financial derivatives to manage their 













Table 1 – Study sample hedging decision 
 
Company name Hedgers Non-hedgers 
Ahlstrom Oyj     X 
Altri SGPS SA X     
Arctic Paper SA X     
BillerudKorsnas publ AB     X 
Canfor Corp X     
Cascades Inc X     
Catalyst Paper Corp X     
Domtar Corp X     
Empresas CMPC SA     X 
ENCE Energia y Celulosa SA X     
Fibria Celulose SA     X 
Hokuetsu Kishu Paper Co Ltd     X 
Holmen AB     X 
Interfor Corp X     
International Paper Co     X 
Klabin SA     X 
Lee & Man Paper Manufacturing Ltd X     
Louisiana-Pacific Corp     X 
Marubeni Corp X     
Mercer International Inc     X 
Metsa Board Oyj X     
Mitsubishi Paper Mills Ltd     X 
Mondi PLC X     
Nine Dragons Paper Holdings Ltd     X 
Norbord Inc     X 
Norske Skogindustrier ASA X     
Oji Holdings Corp     X 
Papeles y Cartones de Europa SA X     
Portucel SA     X 
Rayonier Inc     X 
Rottneros AB     X 
Sappi Ltd     X 
Shandong Chenming Paper Holdings 
Ltd 
    X 
Smurfit Kappa Group PLC     X 
Stora Enso Oyj     X 
Suzano Papel e Celulose SA X     
Svenska Cellulosa SCA AB     X 
Tembec Inc X     
UPM-Kymmene Oyj     X 
Verso Corp X     
West Fraser Timber Co Ltd     X 





4. Model and Results: Hedging firm 
characteristics 
 
To start, for the hedging and firm characteristics model, I separated firms into 
two groups, those which choose to hedge their commodity risk price with 
financial derivatives instruments and those which did not. The implicit 
assumption is that those firms which choose not to hedge, did so because hedging 
commodity price would not have offered an increase in firm value. These firms 
do not have the necessary characteristics to profitably benefit from hedging 
strategies with financial derivatives. A comparison between the firms that use 
the financial instruments to hedge and those which did not, should help to 
discern which value-enhancing firm characteristics distinguish the two groups. 
After discerning about the firm’s characteristics among the two classes, I will 
establish a model exclusively focused on the relation between hedging and firm 
value in order to have a more consistent conclusion about the specific case of the 
pulp and paper industry.  
In summary, on a first step and following the same structure as Nance, Smith, 
Smithson (1993) on their study “on the determinants of corporate hedging”, I will 
apply and incorporate the same approach as they did. Furthermore, I will 
introduce also the revisit elaborated by Fok, Carrol and Chiou (1996) and 
incorporate the relation between ownership structure and risk management. The 
objective is to bring together both works into a single one that can provide a much 
wider coverage of the scope of the study, in order to find consistent conclusions 
about the relationship of hedging and firm characteristics in pulp and paper 




To examine the relationship between the hedging decision and firm 
characteristics, I will employ a logistic (LOGIT) regression analysis. On the model 
are included a dependent variable that proxies for the decision of a firm to 
develop hedging strategies with financial derivatives to cover their commodity 
risk, plus 9 independent variables that measures the convexity of tax function, 
the probability of financial distress, firm size, agency costs of equity and debt also 
a variable to reflect alternatives to hedging. 
𝐻𝐷 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑇𝐿𝐹 + 𝛽𝐹𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 +  𝛽𝐷\𝑉 + 𝛽𝐸\I + 𝛽𝐵𝑡𝑀 + 𝛽𝐴|𝑆 + 𝛽𝑀𝑂 +  𝛽𝐼𝑂 + 𝛽𝐷𝑌 + 𝜀    
Dependent Variable 
Hedging Dummy – The dependent variable is coded as “1” for firms which use 
financial instruments (futures, forwards, swaps and / or options) and “0” if they 
did not use any instrument to mitigate their commodity risk. 
Independent Variables 
One variable is used to reflect aspects of the firm’s effective tax function, which 
is the amount of tax loss carry forwards available in 2014 to offset tax payable in 
the subsequent years. Tax preference items (for example, tax loss carry forwards, 
investment tax credits and foreign tax credits) make the effective tax schedule 
more convex (Zimmerman (1998)). Therefore, is expected a positive relation 
between the tax variable and the hedging decision, since the tax hypothesis 
propose that hedger firms have a large amount of tax loss carry forwards and 
also that the benefits associated to a hedging decision should be higher for firms 
with more tax preference items (Smith and Stulz (1995). 
To infer about the hypotheses regarding the reduction in the transactions costs of 




variables to measure the firm’s leverage. Size of the firm is measured by the sum 
of the book value of debt plus the market of equity. As Block and Gallager (1986) 
stated, larger firms are more capable to invest resources in specialized 
management dedicated to perform and conduct a hedging program with 
financial derivatives. Moreover, Smith and Stulz (1995) argued that corporate 
risk management programs exhibit informational scale economies. Hence, is 
expected that large firms are more likely to hedge.  
The variables used to proxy for the probability of financial distress are two debt 
ratios.  The three year average (2012 to 2014) debt-to-firm value ratio and the 
times interested earned which specifically indicates how many times a company 
can cover its interest expenses on a pretax basis. Since that the probability to incur 
in a situation of financial distress is related to the capacity of a firm to fulfill its 
debt obligations, hedging becomes more valuable as the firm’s fixed claims rise 
(Smith and Stulz (1985)). Therefore is expected that more levered firms adopt 
more hedging strategies.  
As Collins and Kothari (1989) approach, the ratio of the book value of the equity 
to the market value proxy for the growth options in the opportunity set and can 
act too as representatives for the agency costs of debt. The higher the book-to-
market value of equity ratio, the lower are the expected earnings growth and 
lower are the incentives for a firm to hedge. The ratio of the book value of the 
firm’s assets to “my” firm size variable is the other proxy for growth 
opportunities and as Nance, Smith and Smith (1993) argued, firms with higher 
ratios of book value of assets over size have more growth potential.  For both the 
variables is expected that firms with more growth opportunities in their 




Regarding the influence of managerial and institutional ownership on the 
hedging decision, two variables were established. The % of managerial 
ownership as an indication of agency costs of equity which is measured by the 
stock holdings by officers and executives. As Fok, Carroll and Chiou (1997) 
argued, managers who own more firm shares in their portfolios have a stronger 
incentive to hedge. On the other hand, the % institutional ownership includes 
ownership by insurance companies, investment companies, bank trust funds and 
foundations. Taking into consideration that institutional owners monitors 
management more intensively, for both dimensions of ownership structure is 
expected a positive relation with the hedging decision. 
The last variable incorporated in the model is the five year (2009 to 2014) 
dividend yield of the firms included in the sample and reflect 
alternatives/substitutes for hedging. Since, management can adopt alternatives 
policies to reduce the probability of financial distress by reducing dividends, the 
lower is the dividend payout ratio, more capable is a firm to meet its debt 
obligations. Hence, the use of alternatives to hedging may reduce the need to use 
financial derivatives to develop a hedging strategy (Nance, Smith and Smith 
(1993)). 
The statistic differences and the expected relations among the variables between                                               
hedgers and non-hedgers are reported on the table 2. Regarding the alternative 
specifications of the logit regressions explaining the use of financial derivatives 







Table 2 - Differences between hedgers and non-hedgers  
Expected relations among the variables and a comparison of the means values 
for the 42 pulp & paper companies included in the sample. 
 





Hedgers & Non 
Hedgers 
Hedgers              
(n= 17 ) 
Non 
Hedgers   
(n= 25 )  H NH t-statistic 
(1) Tax Loss Carry Forward H>NH 24,09 38,65  -14,56 0,94 
(2) EBIT / Interest Expense H<NH 2,91 5,33  -2,42 1,61* 
(3) Debt / Firm Value H>NH 49,30 27,95  21,35 -3,26*** 
(4) Firm Value  H>NH 3901,41 6772,41  -2871 1,38* 
(5) Book / Market  H<NH 63,11 78,45  -15,34 1,28* 
(6) Book Value Assets / 
Value 
H<NH 1,31 1,08  0,23 -1,88** 
(7) Institutional Ownership H>NH 32,16 41,07  -8,91 1,01 
(8) Managerial Ownership H>NH 28,91 25,68  3,23 -0,38 
(9) Dividend Yield  H>NH 1,72 3,32  1.6 1,47* 




Table 3 - Alternate Specifications of Logit regressions explaining the use of financial derivatives to hedge against the commodity 
risk exposure.  
























0,030 -0,0016        
0,016 0,015        
0,857 0,915        
EBIT/Interest - 
-0,115 -0,123 -0,126 -0,099     -0,155 
0,184 0,184 0,182 0,164     0,125 
0,532 0,506 0,490 0,546     0,02** 
Debt/Value + 
0,032 0,032 0,032 0,034 0,0435  0,059 0,059  
0,031 0,030 0,030 0,030 0,027  0,028 0,027  




Firm Value + 
<0,001 <0,001 <0,001     <0,001  
<0,001 <0,001 <0,001     <0,001  




3,760 3,777 3,80 3,75 3,52 4,361     3,49 
1965 1958 1938 1,95 1,89 1817     1665 
0,05*** 0,05** 0,05** 0,05** 0,062* 0,016***       
Book/Market - 
-0,0557 -0,054 -0,055 -0,051 -0,043 -0,049 -0,032 -0,033 -0,034 
0,023 0,022 0,021 0,019 0,018 0,017 0,017 0,015 0,015 




-0,009               0,024 
0,030               0,016 




-0,058 -0,051 -0,052 -0,047 -0,044 -0,045 0,036 -0,037   
0,037 0,028 0,026 0,022 0,021 0,020 0,018 0,02   




-0,4561 -0,46 -0,462   -0,432 -0,37 -0,37 -0,38 -0,36 
0,268 0,263 0,262   0,245 0,194 0,194 0,207 0,216 
0,088* 0,08 0,078*   0,079* 0,03** 0,056* 0,065* 0,094* 




4.1 Empirical evidence on hedging and firm characteristics 
model 
 
The analysis start with the sample mean difference tests for the considered 
hedger commodity risk firms and non-hedger firms. The hedger firms are those 
that used financial derivatives as hedging strategies to control their exposure to 
the commodity risk price in 2014. Thus, the Logit regression model explains 
which factors from the combined group of independent variables are connected 
to the likelihood of corporate hedging. 
 4.1.1 Summary statistics 
 
Regarding tax incentives for a firm to hedge, the related literature suggest that 
the tax benefit of hedging is higher for firms with more with more tax preference 
items. Using tax loss carry-forwards as a proxy for the existence of tax shields, 
there is no support for the hypotheses that managers hedge to reduce expected 
liability. Moreover, the mean differences were not statistically significant, and 
hedger firms have a lower amount of tax loss carry-forwards than the non-
hedgers.  
Hedger firms have higher leverage comparing to firms that did not adopt any 
hedging strategy. Taking into account the risk management literature, 
theoretically hedging becomes more valuable as the firms fixed claims rise, 
supporting the thesis of hedging as value-enhancing strategy, reducing the 
variance of firm value and the expected costs of financial distress. Observing that 
the mean differences between hedgers have a statistic level of significance of less 
than 1%, there is important evidence consistent with the hypotheses of firms with 
higher leverage to have a higher tendency to develop more hedging strategies to 




how many times a company can cover its debt obligations is lower for hedge 
firms. With a significant level of 10%, the mean differences between the two 
groups of firms indicates that firms with a more capacity to deal with their 
interest expenses are less likely to develop a specific risk management policy 
with financial derivatives to cover for the commodity price exposure. 
As Mayers (1997) argued, hedging can control the underinvestment problem by 
restricting the states in which the firm would default on debt payments. To test 
the hypothesis that firms with more growth opportunities are more likely to 
develop hedging strategies, I established two variables in order to provide 
evidence regarding differences between the two groups in their investment set. 
For both the variables there are consistent significant levels regarding the mean 
differences between the two sample groups. 
 As Collins and Kothari (1989) referred on their analysis of intertemporal and 
cross-sectional determinants of earning response coefficients, market-to-book 
value ratio depends upon the extent to which the firm’s return on its existing 
assets and expected future investments exceeds its required return on equity. 
Since future earnings are affected by growth opportunities, the higher the book-
to-market value of equity ratio, the lower are the expected earnings growth. In 
accordance to the hedging literature and observing the sample values, the 
variable book-to-market ratio is lower for hedger firms and the mean 
comparisons between the groups appoint to a significant level of confidence of 
10%. Despite the significance between the groups, the ratio of book value of assets 
over value is higher for the hedger firms as not suggested by the hedging 
literature. Furthermore, for the mentioned variable, there is a consistent statistical 
level of confidence of 5% on the mean differences between the two groups. 
The mean differences in institutional and managerial ownership for hedged and 




have a higher percentage of managerial ownership comparing to the non-hedger 
firms. On the hedging literature, there are several arguments appointing to a 
positive relation between the willingness to pursue hedging strategies by the 
managers related to their higher preponderance on the corporate ownership 
structure. As Gay and Nam (1998) stated, mangers with less diversified personal 
portfolios due to the higher stock ownership in the firm are more likely to 
develop corporate risk management, once their personal portfolios are strictly 
connected with the firm performance. 
The ability for institutional investors to restrain opportunistic behaviors from 
managers is not confirmed by the mean differences results. Moreover, 
contradicting the hedging theory, the hedger firms have less percentage 
ownership in their structure comparing to the non-hedgers. So, the argument 
towards the disciplinary pressure imposed by the institutional investors seems 
to not have an effect on manager’s decision regarding their exposure to 
commodity prices in the pulp and paper industry. 
To examine the hypotheses about the substitutes for hedging, and as Nance et al 
(1993) did, I collected information about the dividend yields of the sample firms. 
The mean differences between the two groups of firms resulted in statistical level 
of significance of 10%, however with a contrary signal of what the hedging theory 
suggested. Hedger firms have less dividends payouts than non-hedgers. 
4.1.2. Hedging and firm characteristics model findings 
 
The mean comparison tests between the groups can only work as a starting point 
to the analysis, providing only insights of the unconditional relationships 
between firm characteristics and hedging. In order to develop a more consistent 





When including all the right-hand-side variables that correspond to the firm’s 
characteristics that theoretically have influence in the hedging decision, the 
coefficients of the ratio of the book value of assets over value, the book-to-market 
ratio, the institutional ownership and the dividend yield variable are significant 
at conventional levels. For the growth opportunities proxy book-to-market the 
signal was as expected, although for institutional ownership, dividends and book 
value of assets over value ratio, the coefficient signals are in the opposite 
direction regarding the hedging theory.  
For this industry, it is not clear that firms with more growth opportunities have 
a greater incentive to hedge, despite the 5% level of statistical confidence 
attributed to the proxy variables that are documented in the Table 3. However, 
the coefficient associated to the Book-to-market variable attains a level of statistic 
confidence of 1% on the conditional relationships derived on the restricted 
model, a favorable insight that goes toward the hedging literature, since lower 
book-to-equity value ratios represent higher investment growth opportunities 
for firms. 
As initially documented by the mean difference tests and further on the logit 
regression, none of the coefficients related to the variables reflecting the tax 
benefit of hedging and the firm size are significant. For the sample firms, there is 
no advantage for the larger firms to establish hedging strategies, not giving 
support to the argument of economies in scale in hedging. 
The sample size is small relative to the number of parameters estimated, because 
I used nine explanatory variables, while I only collected data from 42 companies 
in the pulp and paper industry. To have access to more consistent findings, I 





In the table 3, are reported the results associated with eight of these logit-
regressions. The sign of the coefficient of the proxy variable for leverage, goes 
toward the hedging literature, with an increasing level of statistic confidence. The 
results of the restricted regression, suggested that if the level of coverage of fixed 
claims is the only variable included to proxy for leverage, it is possible to observe 
that the ratio of earnings before interest and taxes divided by total interest 
expenses is statistically significant at a reasonable level of 20% confidence. 
Moreover, if the only variable included in the model to proxy for leverage, is the 
debt over value ratio, as the table 3 reports, statistical levels of confidence of 5% 
are attained. Both the coefficients are in accordance to the hedging literature, with 
the higher levered firms more likely to hedge and firms with a higher coverage 
for fixed claims less likely to hedge. Undoubtedly, there is a correlation between 
the leverage proxy variables. 
However, the option for the added restricted regressions also reduce more the 
confidence about the hypotheses that firms in the pulp and paper industry use of 
tax preference items and their firm size are important determinants of their 
hedging policy.  
Surprisingly, the managerial ownership variable starts to have a consistent level 
of confidence as reported on the restricted specification number nine on the table 
3. It´s also important to observe a reinforcement of the predictive power of the 
institutional ownership variable. Despite both the coefficients of the mentioned 
variables have a contrary signal from what is predicted on the hedging literature, 
the managerial ownership coefficient sign can be a result consistent with the 
entrenchment hypotheses. As managers start to have a higher portion of shares 
of their own firm in their personal portfolios, managers become less monitored 





5. Model and Results: hedging and firm 
value model 
 
After the research about firm characteristics and hedging practices in the 
industry, I will apply the same approach as Jin and Jorion (2006) and their work 
about corporate risk management of oil and gas producers. So, as a second target 
I will try to infer regarding the relation of firm value and hedging with a more 
directly approach - Hedging and Firm Value model. 
Regarding the dependence of the hedging commodity price decision 
(explanatory variable) and firm value (dependent variable), my option is to use 
a multivariate analysis. The dependent variable is Tobin’s Q ratio which is a 
measure of firm’s assets in relation to a firm’s market value. The 
acknowledgement behind the underlying ratio is that firms should be worth 
what their assets are worth, so a ratio number under one theoretically appoints 
to a firm that is undervalued. Hence, Tobin’s Q ratio is used an approximation of 
firm value. The independent variables are constituted by several control 
variables and a dummy variable that reflects the company decision of developing 
or not the hedging strategies designed to mitigate the commodity price exposure. 
Factors considered to connect and to correlate the firm’s hedging decision and its 
value are assumed to be used as control variables: financial distress costs, level 
of profitability, managerial ownership and agency costs. The utility of these 
control variables is to remove the effect of them on the explained variable. 
The regression equation is described in the following way: 
𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑛´𝑠 𝑄 = α + 𝛽ℎ𝑒𝑑𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑔 × 𝐻𝑒𝑑𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑥𝑦 + ∑ 𝛾𝑗 ×
𝑗





All the control variables are designated to gauge for the effect of each of the 
variables in the dependent variables, the Tobin´s Q ratio. The control variables 
are of extreme importance and it is essential and mandatory that an assertive 
choice can be made regarding their inclusion in the model, once each of their 
coefficients represents the partial effect of the given explanatory variable on my 
firm value variable proxy. Resuming, each of the coefficients is a partial 
regression coefficient and a safekeeping to control the effect of all other 
explanatory variables.   
Taking as a starting point, the study developed by Jin and Jorion (2006), 
regarding the hedging practices of oil and gas producers, my regression 
coefficient on the hedging proxy (𝛽hedging), is established to be understood as 
the hedging premium. The mentioned coefficient reflects the theoretical excess 
return on hedged firms versus non hedged commodity exposure firms. 
All the other parameters (𝛾𝑗), will measure the effect of each of the introduced 
explanatory variables on Tobin’s Q ratio. Since my sample of study is related to 
the firm’s hedging practices in 2014, I interpret each firm-2014 observation for the 
42 pulp and paper companies as an independent observation and by doing that, 
I am moving away from the problem of over-estimating p-values and 
underestimate standard errors, since Tobin’s Q refers only to a sample firm. 
Dependent variable 
Tobin’s Q was introduced in 1968 by James Tobin a Nobel laureate in the field of 
economics and William Brainard a recognized American economist and 
professor at Yale University.  
𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑛´𝑠 𝑄 =  






Independent and control variables 
Regarding the hedging decision of the firm’s to mitigate their commodity risk 
exposure, on the model is included a hedging dummy variable, a binary variable 
that  equals “1” if the firm developed hedging strategies with financial 
derivatives and coded as “0” if not. This variable reflects the decision of hedging 
commodity price in 2014 by the specific sample firm.  
There were other approaches regarding the mentioned measure. Lookman (2004) 
used the fraction of the subsequent production hedged to cover an unpredictable 
drop in commodity prices. For the same purposes, Tufano (1996) for the gold 
mining companies used the portfolio-delta to represent the impact on the 
portfolio value of a tested small change in in the price of the underlying asset. 
As Jin and Jorion (2006) research on oil and gas producers and taking into account 
the many factors that affect the value of a firm, 5 control variables were included 
in the model. Since the value of a firm is affected by several factors, the purpose 
of the inclusion of these variables is to eliminate those effects.  
Considering that companies in their decision of establishing their hedging 
programs can face significant economies of scale in hedging, as Haushalter (2000) 
argued on his empirical work about oil and gas producers is expected a positive 
correlation between the decision to hedge and their firm size. Furthermore, 
Peltzam (1977) on his work about the gains and losses from industrial 
concentration argued that efficiency is positively related to firm size. Hence, the 
sum of the book value of debt plus the market value of equity of a firm is included 
to control for the size effect.  
In order to control for the impact of a firm leverage on value, I established the 
debt-size ratio (the three-year average 2012 to 2014, of the ratio of the book value 




value of equity). As Jin and Jorion (2006) stated on their work, a firm capital 
structure is related to its value. Moreover, Masulis (1983) on his research 
regarding the impact of capital structure change on firm value, provided 
evidence pointing to the fact that changes in stock prices are positively related to 
leverage changes. 
Campello, Lin, Ma and Zou (2011), provided evidence that hedging reduces the 
cost of external financing and eases the firm´s investment process and also said 
that if firms face problems in raising external funds, they are forced to abandon 
profitability investment opportunities with a net present value higher than zero. 
Furthermore, Froot, Scharfstein and Stein (1993) stated that costly external 
financing is a market imperfection that makes hedging a value-enhancing 
strategy. Hence, the influence of investment growth and the resulting impact on 
a firm performance, should be controlled. I will introduce two proxies for 
investment opportunities, the book-to-market ratio and the book value of Assets 
divided by the book value of debt plus the market value of equity. Since, Guy 
and Nam (1998) stated that one hedger is probable to have larger investment sets. 
Taking into consideration, the capacity for a firm to generate future earnings I 
will adopt a dividend dummy variable to proxy for the wealth financial situation 
of a firm, as well as, bearing in mind that wealthier firms have better conditions 
to access the financial markets with lower costs, which in turn is associated to 
higher firm values. Nissim and Ziv (2001) investigated the relation between 
dividend policies and firms profitability and documented that dividend changes 
provide consistent information regarding the levels of profitability. Furthermore, 
they stated that dividend alterations are positively related to earnings changes. 
The dividend dummy is coded as “1” if the firm paid dividends on the sample 




Regarding the productions costs of firms within the pulp and paper industry, the 
crucial cost drivers are water and energy consumption. Moreover, pulp and 
paper industry is among the largest consumers of both. The possible differences 
in the production costs can establish a comparative advantage between the 
players in this industry regarding the ability to generate profits. A control 
variable, defined as the operating margin will proxy for the different production 
efficiencies among firms. Operating margin is defined by ratio of operating 
income divided by the net sales and it is expected that higher operating margins 
are associated with higher Tobin´s Q ratios. 
The statistic mean differences between hedgers and non-hedgers are reported on 
table 4. Regarding the impact of the hedging strategies on firm value, the results 
are reported on table 5. 
Table 4 - Hedgers vs non-hedgers – statistic mean differences 
Variable 
Means Differences in Means 
Hedgers 
(n= 17 ) 
Non Hedgers 
(n=25) H - NH 
t-
statistic 
Firm Value 3901,41 6672,41 -2870 1,38* 
Debt / Firm Value 49,30 27,95 21,35 -3,26*** 
Book / Market 63,11 78,45 -15,34 -1,28* 
Operating Margin 5,62 7,58 -1,965 10,04 
Dividend Dummy 0,65 0,84 -0,193 1,44* 
Tobin’s Q 0,04 0,06 -23,95 2,41** 







Table 5 - Hedging and firm value model results 
Observations  N=42   < [95% Conf. Interval] > 
Tobin´s Q Coefficient Std. error P>[t] Lower bound Upper bound 
Hedging Dummy -0,097 0,072 0,18 -0,024 0,049 
Firm Size <0,001 <0,001 0,22 <-0,001 <0,001 
Debt / Size -0,007 0,002 <0,001*** -1,048 -0,004 
Dividend Dummy -0,011 0,086 0,2 -28,57 0,063 
Book to Market -0,003 0,001 <0,001*** -0,508 -0,002 
Operating              
Margin 
0,021 0,006 0,001*** 0,978 0,032 
R-Squared 0,721     
Adjusted R-
Squared 
0,673     
***; **;* 1%, 5%, 10% indicate significance at 1%; 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
 
5.1 Empirical evidence on hedging and firm value model 
 
5.1.1. Summary Statistics 
 
The summary statistics of variables derived on the hedging and firm value model 
are presented at table 4. Summary statistics include Tobin’s Q, Firm value, Debt 
over Firm value, Book-to-market, dividends and the operating margin. 
Regarding the 42 firms of the sector included in the model, there are seventeen 
that engage in hedging commodity prices with financial derivatives and twenty-
five that choose to not hedge their commodity risk exposure. It is possible to 




have a mean firm size of EUR 6 772 million comparing to a mean firm value of 
EUR 3 901 million. According to the hedging theory, what was mentioned does 
not seem to make sense, since it’s expected that firms with more volatile cash 
flows are smaller and do not have the same conditions as the bigger firms, on 
their access to the financial markets. This observation is contrary to the 
conclusion reached by Fok, Carrol and Chiou (1997), when they argued that on 
their sample, firms hedged to take advantage of the economies of scale. 
In accordance to the finance theory, when comparing the mean values, hedger 
firms have a higher leverage ratio comparing to non-hedgers. Hedger firms have 
a mean leverage value of 49.3%, compared to the 27% of the non-hedgers. As 
Stulz (1996) stated, if we have a firm where the cash flows are very volatile and 
fluctuate severely over time, it could happen that an unexpected lower tail 
realization immediately lead to a situation of bankruptcy.  
Hedging literature suggest that firms that use more hedging instruments have 
more growth options in their investment opportunity set. Considering the proxy 
variable for growth opportunities and consequently the mean differences 
between hedgers and non-hedgers for the book-to-market ratio, it is clear that the 
hedger firms have lower book-to-market mean values comparing to the non-
hedgers.  
The level of profitability is measured by the operation efficiency among the 
sample firms. The mean differences between hedgers and non-hedgers reflect 
that the level of operational efficiency is higher for firms that use financial 






5.1.2 Hedging and firm value model findings 
 
The existence of a strategy with financial derivatives to hedge commodity risk 
exposure is associated with a lower Tobin´s Q ratio. Although without a 
traditional level of confidence, it is possible to observe that the option to hedge is 
associated to a lower Tobin´s Q of 0,097 units, as reported in the table 5. 
After the introduction of the control variables, the sign of their coefficients are 
consistent with theory; except for the dividend dummy that proxy for the 
capacity of a firm to have access to the financial markets. 
The levels of profitability measured by the operating margins among the 
included firms are associated with higher firm value, since their positive 
coefficients have a significance level of 1%. 
Leverage and book-to-market value of equity are negatively correlated with firm 
value. By observing the table both variables have a level of statistical confidence 
of 1%, indicating that firms within this industry with lower growth opportunities 
and more debt in their capital structure are associated with lower value.  
R-squared of the model is 0,721, meaning that more than 72% of variation of the 
dependent variable is explained by the explanatory variables included in the 









Most of the theoretical research on risk management, suggest that hedging 
reduces expected tax liability, expected costs of financial distress and agency 
costs of debt and equity.  Departing from the previous studies done by Nance, 
Smith and Smithson (1993) and the revisit on their work elaborated by Fok, 
Carroll and Chiou (1997), I have gathered the two models, in order to introduce 
the improvements developed by the later authors. Taking into consideration both 
of the studies and following the same structure and the econometric models 
established by the authors, I collected financial data from a diversified firm 
characteristics pulp and paper listed companies, with the objective to find a 
connection between the theoretical incentives of the hedging literature and the 
specific firm characteristics within this industry.  
Although, the scope of the study was only on the use of the financial derivatives 
to mitigate the commodity risk exposure within the pulp and paper industry.  
Regarding the tax incentives for a firm to hedge to mitigate their commodity risk 
exposure, I reached to the same conclusion as Nance Smith and Smith (1993) and 
Fok, Carroll and Chiou (1993). There is no support for the hypotheses that 
reducing expected tax liability is a key factor explaining a decision to develop a 
risk management policy.  
Nevertheless, pulp and paper firms with higher amounts of debt in their capital 
structure engage more in hedging strategies to control for their commodity risk 
exposure. This conclusion goes toward the view of hedging as a value-enhancing 
strategy, as Stulz (1996) argued, firms with higher amounts of permanently debt 
obligations are more susceptible to suffer from a negative earnings shock or 




Interestingly, my scope of analysis within the pulp and paper industry, regarding 
managerial ownership as provided the same results as Fok, Carroll and Chiou.  
If non-shareholder-value maximizing behavior increases as managerial 
ownership increases, consequently, firms also suffer a negative impact on their 
values. That is consistent with the management entrenchment hypotheses. The 
negative relationship between corporate hedging and managerial ownership is 
associated to the extent that, as managers start build up a solid firm ownership, 
accumulating large amounts of firm stock, they do not employ the necessary 
resources to value-enhancing strategies, like establishing the appropriate risk 
management policy. As a result of the improved ownership, managers tend to be 
less monitored by outside investors, whom otherwise could control for non-value 
maximizing activities. 
Jin and Jorion (2006) investigated more directly the relation between the decision 
of hedging and firm value and provided evidence regarding this connection for 
the oil and gas producers. I established the same approach as Jin and Jorion (2006) 
did, although I applied it for the pulp and paper industry, in order to gather 
evidence on how the decision to hedge the commodity risk exposure can affect 
firm value within this industry. 
Expected relations between firm characteristics and firm value derived from the 
hedging and firm value model are in accordance with theory. Leverage is 
negatively correlated with firm value and size of the firm, and both level of 
profitability and growth opportunities in the investment set are associated with 
higher firm values. However, the established model proves that the decision to 
manage commodity risk within this industry is not in accordance to the value-
enhancing prospects of the hedging literature. Moreover, the results demonstrate 
that efforts to manage commodity risk with financial derivatives are only 




A contribution of this study is the proved relation between firm value and the 
level of growth opportunities in the pulp and paper industry. Pulp and paper 
industry is among the largest consumers of energy and water, which are the 
critical cost drivers in today´s cash constrained environment within this industry. 
Regarding the challenge of pursuing sustainability to create value, companies 
within this industry must be one-step ahead, developing new products and 
market opportunities opened up by growing environmental consumer trends.  
Taking into consideration the model results, investment growth opportunities 
are clearly associated to higher firm value. Hence, opportunities to improve 
resource efficiency which require significant capital expenditure, need to be 
carefully weight to ensure that those chosen, have a positive net present value 
and don´t destroy value for the company. Developing sustainable or certified raw 
materials and decreasing energy consumption are not enough, however, those 
will be important steps towards sustainability transformation within pulp and 
paper industry. 
To finish, the results extolled by the models allow us to affirm that the 
methodologies for the assessment of risks must be adapted to each organization 
in order to able to meet and to shape to the particularities of a particular company 
in a specific industry. 
Future research 
 
Risk management has assumed and increasingly important role in the strategic 
agenda of companies and is a fundamental tool in order to give support for 
management in a complex and unstable macroeconomic environment. To deal 
with the global uncertainties and given the challenges for firms within this 
industry, I recommend a deeper and more specific analysis regarding the 




strategies to adopt. Namely, which are the most profitable and efficient hedging 
instruments to mitigate the firms risk exposure, including the experience from 
previous strategies, changes, successes and failures. Since putting forth the 
appropriate risk management policy within this industry can add value because 
it helps ensure that the corporation has sufficient funds available and make the 
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